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Who decides Nigeria’s 2027 president: Ballot or bullet?

BY FESTUS ADEDAYO, Ph.D

As Nigeria inches closer to the 2027 general elections, the familiar drums of political hostility are beating once again. Across the country, violent rhetoric, convoy attacks, and targeted intimidation, are casting a dark shadow over the democratic process. Since campaigns officially kicked off in August, at least eleven major incidents of electoral violence have been recorded. They range from the disruption of an NDC town hall in Lagos and attacks on party rallies in Enugu, to the obstruction of presidential candidate, Peter Obi’s convoy in Benue, as well as the October ambush on ADC senatorial candidate, Heberta Okonofua in Edo State.

While alarming, these incidents are neither isolated nor new. They are the latest symptoms of a violent political culture woven into the very fabric of Nigeria’s electoral history.

Nigeria has at best a legacy of elections written in blood. The rain of political thuggery began beating Nigeria long before the Fourth Republic and even before independence. In 1953, when the Action Group (AG) toured Northern Nigeria to campaign for independence, the move triggered large-scale riots in Kano. Supporters of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and Southerners living in Sabon Gari, particularly the Igbo, bore the brunt of a conflict they did not start. Around the same period, the Tiv faced brutal suppression for opposing the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) regional government and demanding Middle Belt autonomy.

By the First Republic, electoral contests had fully degenerated into warfare. Ahead of the 1964/65 general elections, both the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and the AG, later allied under the United Progressive Grand Alliance, (UPGA) treated the ballot as a do-or-die affair.

Nigerian Tribune editions of the period read like war dispatches: On June 20, 1964, its lead story was, “Act of thuggery: NCNC fires Yoruba Obas.” It was a report which linked Chief S. L. Akintola’s government to political brigandage in the West. In its June 24 and 29, 1964 report, the newspaper’s banner headlines screamed: “NNDP thugs hit Ado, Ife.” It prompted a grim editorial comment in the newspaper on hooliganism. This forced a regional curfew and an emergency intervention in Lagos by ceremonial president, Nnamdi Azikiwe.

On October 2, 1965, following UPGA’s failed court injunction to restrain the Electoral Commission under Mr. T. Esua from declaring candidates unopposed, the Tribune reported mass displacements across Osun, Ife, and Ilesa. In Osogbo, it reported that a Mrs. Fatoki, wife of an UPGA candidate, was severely macheted and that, in Ilesa, thugs smashed the vehicle of an UPGA candidate, Bola Sadipe.

As Prof Eghosa Osaghae notes in his Crippled Giant, (1998) while both sides deployed violence, the NNDP weaponized state incumbency to devastating effect. There is near-unanimous consensus among historians that the 1964/65 electoral crisis, marked by widespread fraud, arson, and the killing of over 200 people in the Western Region, directly triggered the collapse of the First Republic.

Why does this cycle of blood persist? Beneath the surface of Nigeria’s political turbulence lies a fundamental philosophical failure: the triumph of monism over pluralism. Long before the 17th-century philosopher, René Descartes formulated his theory of Cartesian dualism, the idea that reality consists of distinct substances, rather than a single monolithic truth, Yoruba philosophy captured the necessity of multiple perspectives through its proverb, “A kì í dúró ojú kan wò’ran eégún.” It translates to read that, one does not stand in a single spot to watch a dancing masquerade. Because a masquerade’s performance is dynamic and multifaceted, an observer must constantly shift angles to appreciate its full form.

In contrast, Nigerian politics is trapped in a rigid, monist worldview. It is a mindset of “I and I alone.” When political actors believe there is only one legitimate path to power and no room for opposition, democracy ceases to be a contest of ideas and becomes a zero-sum war for survival. Violence becomes the way out.

This monist mindset is reinforced by structural and historical forces that turn elections into existential battles. First, as scholars, Kelechi Ani and Dominique Uwizeyimana observe, British colonialism, the type Nigeria went through, was established through “naked brutality” and military subjugation. Rather than dismantling this coercive apparatus at independence, Nigeria’s political class inherited it, institutionalizing violence and the militarization of the polity as standard tools of governance.

Political scientist, Billy Dudley, also famously noted that Nigerian politicians view public office as an investment for acquiring extraordinary wealth unavailable through legitimate enterprise, stating this to be where “politics means money and money means politics.” Legendary political scientist, Claude Ake, also pushed this further by saying that in Nigeria, those who win state power can accumulate limitless wealth without working, while those who lose have no security even for wealth earned through honest labour. Consequently, to capture the state becomes a matter of life and death.

As a 2007 United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report highlighted, political parties often operate like mafia syndicates controlled by “godfathers.” These power brokers exploit Nigeria’s mass youth unemployment to recruit idle young men as political mercenaries for the purpose of snatching ballot boxes, assassinate rivals, intimidate electoral officials and deploy state security forces to suppress voters.

While it is possible to hold elections without democracy, it is impossible to sustain democracy without credible elections. Credibility, however, cannot exist where voters are governed by fear.

As 2027 draws near, Nigeria stands at a familiar crossroads. If Nigeria will escape the ghost of 1964, its political class must shift their gaze from the destructive zero-sum logic of political monism. True democracy requires the wisdom of the masquerade’s audience: the willingness to accommodate shifting viewpoints, respect the opposition and allow the ballot, rather than the bullet, to decide who leads Nigeria in 2027.

ADEDAYO is a columnist, journalist, author, lawyer and political scientist. (First published by  Sunday Tribune, November 22, 2026)


Jude Ossai (JP) a veteran journalist is a National Diploma holder in Mass Communication from Ogwashi-Uku Polytechnic Ogwashi-Uku, Delta State. He also studied at Enugu State University of Science and Technology (ESUT) Enugu and Imo State University, Owerri for his first and second degrees in Mass Communication, respectively.
He writes extensively on politics, crime, corruption, climate change, healthcare, human rights, social justice, among others.
He began his journalism career in The Republic Newspaper, Lagos in 1987 as a Special Correspondent in Benin City, Edo State.
In 1990, he was posted from Lagos to old Anambra State as a State Correspondent in Enugu.
In 1994, he joined the African Newspapers of Nigeria (ANN) Plc, Ibadan, Oyo State, Publisher of Nigerian Tribune Newspapers where he rose to the rank of Southeast Bureau Chief.
Retiring from the mainstream traditional media in 2019, he began another journey in online newspaper publication.
He was the Overall Best Reporter in 2015, an award bestowed on him by Correspondents’ Chapel of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), Enugu State.
He has attended several workshops/seminars organised by multi-nationals, government institutions, local and international media including BBC.
He is also a unionist and had held top positions as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Nigerian Union of Journalists of Enugu Correspondents’ Chapel and State Council of NUJ, respectively. He was also a one-time Enugu State Secretary of Sports Writers’ Association of Nigeria (SWAN).